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S.: Constitutional Law--Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection-

CASE COMMENTS
ling reasons involving the national safety or security are present",
and that the Commissioner himself-not a subordinate as in the
past-will certify that such secrecy is necessary. N.Y. Times, Nov.
4, 1956, §4E, p. 12, col 2.
While the recognition of the problem is of some consolation,
it may be argued that the doubtful use of confidential information
will not be rectified by a mere shift in administrative responsibility.
C. H. B., Jr.

CONSTITTI ONAL LAw-SuBTANTIVE

DuE PRocEss

AND EQUAL

DocTORs.Plaintiffs brought an original action in the supreme court of South
Carolina for a declaratory judgment that an act making it unlawful
for any person, whether previously licensed or not, to practice
naturopathy in the state, unless he meets certain prescribed qualifications, was unconstitutional. Held, that the act does not deprive
naturopaths of their property rights without due process of law or
deny them equal protection of the law. Dantzler v. Callison, 94
S.E.2d 177 (S.C. 1956).
PROTECInON-

NATuROPATHS REQUIRED TO BE MEDIcAL

The power of the states to regulate and license the practice of
certain callings has been universally accepted and stands virtually
uncontroverted. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114 (1889). A person's business, profession or occupation is "property" within the meaning of the constitutional provision as to
due process of law. People v. Love, 289 Ill. 304, 181 N.E. 809
(1921). Thus, while the legislature can regulate a calling, it cannot prohibit it, unless the calling is inherently injurious to the
public health, safety or morals, or has a tendency to become so.
Adams v.- Tanner, 244 U.S. 325 (1917). This power of regulation
or prohibition is exercised by the legislature, and the courts refuse
to consider the wisdom behind the action, confining themselves to
the constitutional limitations which may be involved. Zahn v. Board
of Public Works, 274 U.S. 825 (1927); Adams v. Tanner, supra.
These limitations relate to the reasonableness of the action taken.
When the legislature makes requirements which have no relation
to a calling or are unattainable by reasonable study and application
they may operate to deprive an individual of his constitutional property rights. Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F.2d 155 (W.D. Wash. 1925);
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People v. Witte, 315 Ill. 282, 146 N.E. 178 (1924); Dent v. West
Virginia, supra.
To require a chiropodist to obtain the license of a physician
and surgeon or an osteopath is unreasonable. State v. Armstrong,
38 Idaho 493, 225 Pac. 491 (1923). Chiropody is limited to healing
the feet The allopathic, osteopathic and naturopathic theories of
healing deal with every aspect of healing the entire body, internally
and externally. It is doubtful that even the most credulous sufferer
would call upon a chiropodist to cure a severe abdominal pain.
In this case the plaintiff alleged and the defendant admitted
that the act destroyed the profession of naturopathy. The court,
however, clearly shows that such a conclusion is erroneous. The
act simply makes it unlawful for certain persons to practice naturopathy, whether previously licensed or not. It is, thus, regulatory
and not prohibitory. Legalistically speaking, the requirements for
prohibition set forth in Adams v. Tanner, supra, are inapplicable
and need not be considered. However, for all practical intents and
purposes, the practice of naturopathy as a separate branch of the
healing arts has been prohibited. It is safe to assume that one who
has been trained under the allopathic theory of healing will not hold
himself out to the public as a naturopath.
The legislature is not required to accept every theory of healing which is advanced. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fife,
274 U.S. 720 (1927). South Carolina, at first, accepted the naturopathic theory. S.C. 'CODE c., 56, §§ 901 to 919 (1952). However,
a subsequent legislative investigation showed that the practice of
the theory, by its very nature limited in curative devices, has been,
or may very well be injurious to the public. A believing sufferer
with an abdominal pain would very likely seek the aid of one who
holds himself out to the public as a healer of all internal and external
ills of the body. The legislature decided that it would prefer that
the practitioner have more than one recognized curative theory
available after diagnosis. The removal or transplanting of internal
organs, (often the only recognized cure), does not fall within the

limits of naturopathy.
Since accepting the naturopathic theory, the legislature has recognized the deficiency within it. It is well established that the
state's legitimate concern for a high standard of professional conduct
extends beyond acceptance of the theory and initial examining and
licensing. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). The
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requiring of an examination and license without continuing supervision would provide little protection for the public. Barsky v. Board
of Regents, supra.
The act herewith concerned is aimed at the practitioner, not
at the science, and the line has been drawn where the legislature
has found the practitioner to be "border-lining" the other recognized theories of healing. Where human lives are concerned, it is
inadequate to provide merely a penalty for exceding limitations.
This act erases the opportunity for "border-lining" by requiring a
higher standard of skill and learning.
Such "border-lining" is evident among other professions also.
An accountant, called upon to solve a tax problem, may inadvertently
give his client purely legal advice. The same result may occur in
the relationship between client and real estate broker. A nurse, in
the normal course of her duties, might be guilty of practicing medicine without a license. However, it would clearly be unreasonable
to require all accountants and real estate brokers to be lawyers and
all nurses to be graduates of accredited medical colleges for doctors.
Each of these professions is necessary to facilitate daily business and
personal affairs and none is inherently dangerous. The most important distinction is that the titles attached to these professions
and the definitions of the professions themselves do not mislead the
public by appearing to show qualification in any other field.
The South Carolina legislature has determined that naturopaths
are not adequately equipped to be general practitioners. Whether
or not this determination was reasonable is, at most, fairly debatable.
In such case it is clear that the court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, supra;
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Rast v. Van Deman &
L. Co., 240 U.S. 842 (1916); Price v. Illinois, 288 U.S. 446 (1915);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian,289 U. S. 394 (1915); Davis v. Beeler, 185
Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.2d 348 (1947). See GE.LuoRN, INDvmuAL
FrxEDom An Goy

r

sTamr

(1956).

C. R. S.
INSuRANcE-AccmENTAL DEATH-NoTic E TO INSuRE.-A, a resident of Virginia, purchased an airline ticket for an airplane trip from
Newark to Provincetown: Before boarding the plane at Newark, he
purchased from B an airline trip insurance policy with A's wife, C,
as beneficiary. The plane carrying A went down at sea and A was
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